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Despite the high-decibel rhetoric about 
the Justice and Development Party 
(known by its Turkish acronym AKP) 
being an Islamist threat to Turkey’s de-
mocracy, the party won a resounding 
mandate in the July 22 parliamentary 
election. This means that the majority 
of Turks have rejected the politics of fear 
spread by AKP’s rivals and understand 
that the struggle in Turkey is not be-
tween Islamists and secularists, but be-
tween rival elites in a zero-sum game 
where the success of one diminishes 
the power and wealth of the other. Tra-
ditional republican elites entrenched in state institutions, business, and 
the military have been calling the shots for decades. The upstart AKP 
and the socially conservative majority that supports it not only have 
a corner on political power, but also have begun to do well enough 
to challenge the republicans in globalization and economic develop-
ment. The presence or absence of a headscarf has become emblematic 
of much broader issues in a power struggle between segments of the 
population. This election marks the high-water point for the AKP, but 
the politics of fear that preceded it continues to threaten Turkey’s hard-
won stability. 
Since it came to power in 2002 on a wave of popular revulsion against 
corrupt and ineffectual secular parties, AKP has initiated a courageous 
programme of reform in a bid to join the European Union. Ironically, 
those who continue to tout the superiority of a secular European life-
style are the least likely to appreciate the introduction of European-
inspired liberal values that loosen state control of religious practices 
and clothing (headscarves are currently banned 
in government institutions, including universi-
ties) and that expand the rights of Turkey’s ethnic 
and religious minorities. Some of the Turkish old 
guard view minorities like the Armenian, Greek 
Orthodox, and Jewish communities as a European 
fifth column intent on undermining Turkish terri-
torial integrity. Forced to play the nationalist card 
in the pre-election dust-up, AKP seems unwilling 
to challenge conservative forces blocking imple-
mentation of new laws that broaden ethnic and 
religious minority rights. 
The election hothouse
Since so much rested on this election, attempts 
to manipulate public opinion took a dangerous 
turn that threatened—and continues to threat-
en—both Turkey’s democracy and its chances for 
European Union membership. The most impor-
tant of these was the unexpectedly bold entry 
of Turkey’s military onto the political playing 
field after almost a decade of acquiescence to 
the elected government’s programmes. The last 
major military intervention in politics was the so-
called “soft coup” of 1997, in which the military-
dominated National Security Council, an advisory 
body to the government, pushed out an Islamist 
prime minister the army suspected of being insuf-
ficiently committed to the secular foundation of 
the state. Since then, the military’s power on the 
council and elsewhere has begun to be reduced 
in line with European Union requirements that a 
nation’s military be subordinate to its 
elected government. 
In the hothouse atmosphere preced-
ing the election, the army resorted to a 
new tool to influence politics—its web-
site www.tsk.mil.tr. On April 27, parlia-
ment had voted to put forward the 
name of the well-respected AKP for-
eign minister Abdullah Gül to replace 
Turkey’s strongly secular president, 
Ahmet Necdet Sezer, whose term had 
come to an end. The opposition Re-
publican People’s Party (RPP) claimed 
the vote was invalid because it lacked a 
quorum. That night the military posted a memorandum on its website 
that has come to be called the first coup by website or “cyber coup.” In 
the unsigned statement, the army threatened to interfere if the elec-
tion of Gül, whose wife wears a headscarf, went ahead. In following 
weeks, further statements were posted. One called for a social reac-
tion against “forces who act in the guise of democracy and freedom 
of speech,” leading many to wonder if the army was urging a popular 
uprising against the government and liberal institutions. Millions dem-
onstrated in support of the military’s guardianship of secularism, but a 
new generation has come of age in Turkey with no experience of coups 
against elected governments (the last of which was in 1980) that was 
surprised and disturbed by such blatant intervention in the democratic 
process. This may well have had an impact on the election outcome—
AKP won 46.7% of the vote and 341 of the 550 seats in parliamentary—
as thousands of newly eligible young voters had their say.
As a result of the April 27 “cyber coup,” the government moved par-
liamentary elections that had been scheduled for fall to July 22 in the 
hopes that a larger AKP presence in parliament would ensure a quorum 
and make it politically difficult for the military to counter the wishes of 
a democratically elected government with a clear mandate. The AKP 
also put on the table a proposal to amend the constitution to allow 
the president to be elected by popular vote, a proposition recently ap-
proved by the Constitutional Court and which will be subjected to a 
popular referendum in October. Despite a higher percentage of votes 
than in the last election, however, AKP gained fewer seats in the new 
parliament due to the entry of a third party. The Nationalist Action 
Party (NAP), which has been associated with ultranationalist violence 
in the past, picked up 71 seats and will join the militantly secular RPP 
in opposition. Such a powerful nationalist coalition might well block 
future liberal reforms. If the new parliament is unable to elect a presi-
dent within sixty days, the Constitution requires that general elections 
be held again, prolonging the turmoil and uncertainty. In an interest-
ing development, 23 Kurdish nationalist members of the Democratic 
Society Party (DSP) were elected to parliament as independent candi-
dates, a ploy that allowed the Kurdish party to avoid the ten percent 
vote threshold for party representation in parliament. Surprisingly for 
socially conservative eastern and southeastern Anatolia, fifteen of the 
newly elected deputies from that region are women, most of them 
members of the DSP, rather than mainstream parties. The Kurdish DSP 
delegates are a wild card in future coalition building.
The military has put the AKP’s back against the wall by repeatedly 
and publicly asking the elected government to authorize a military op-
eration into northern Iraq to combat the PKK, a banned Kurdish sepa-
ratist organization that is using the region as a base from which to at-
tack Turkey. The AKP government so far has resisted, arguing that the 
Kurdish problem should be addressed first on the Turkish side of the 
border, but its refusal to authorize military action in Iraq makes it look 
soft on terror. If the government does authorize a military incursion, it 
The controversies surrounding the Turkish 
elections should not be seen as a clash between 
secularists and Islamists, but rather as a 
struggle between various elites. In fact, the 
disavowal of its Islamist agenda has enabled 
the AKP to occupy the centre of the political 
spectrum formerly held by the Kemalist 
establishment. These shifts and turns have 
come at a price: nationalism and corruption 
seem to be on the rise. The author concludes 
that the real danger is that these power 
struggles will disable Turkey to develop its 
global, liberal democratic credentials.
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guardian of Ataturk’s dream of a westernized Turkey, must now decide 
whether the project of joining the West (in the form of the EU) will be 
a sufficient safeguard of Turkish national identity and secular lifestyle 
that they can permit themselves to be slowly shorn of power. Anyone 
witnessing the struggles that have convulsed the EU about the role of 
religion, minorities, and fears about loss of national sovereignty and 
identity can well understand the Turkish military’s scepticism and re-
luctance to take the dream of westernization to its conclusion. 
What is most frightening to Turkey’s old elite is AKP’s increasing 
ability to occupy the centre, where most Turkish voters’ interests lie. A 
popular and centrist AKP devoted to liberal values is much more of a 
threat to the secularist, westernized, but essentially illiberal establish-
ment than an AKP harbouring a secret Islamist agenda. AKP has been 
successful where the old guard has not—at least not since the 1980s—
in uniting Turkey's fractious political field and occupying the centre. 
The establishment’s response has been to spread fear that secularist 
lifestyles are in danger and the nation is being undermined by foreign 
powers. The AKP has been forced to turn aside from its own reform 
agenda to prove itself to be as nationalist as its opponents. Nationalism 
has shown itself to be a dangerous force in the past, used to manipu-
late public sentiment that all too easily can spill over into violence. The 
real question is whether post-election Turkey can get back to the busi-
ness of developing its global, liberal democratic credentials or whether 
the pre-election games of Turkey’s embattled elites will have damaged 
the social fabric and the democratic process to such an extent that Tur-
key’s future will be derailed.
will damage relations with the United 
States and the EU and potentially open 
the door to a regional conflagration 
between Turkey (a NATO country) and 
the Iraqi Kurds, whom Turkey accuses 
of aiding the PKK, possibly engaging 
the central Iraqi government and even 
U.S. forces. A Turkish incursion would 
give tacit permission for other neigh-
bouring countries like Iran to enter 
the Iraqi quagmire ostensibly to hunt 
down their own terror candidates. The 
Turkish military, which does not like 
the AKP government, will continue to 
apply pressure, aided by the RPP and 
NAP. In the meantime, it continues to 
mass troops and equipment along the 
Iraqi border.
Immediate and potential 
dangers
A further aspect of Turkey’s politics 
of fear are the links emerging between 
ultranationalist violence and a group 
of former military officers. The alliance 
between Kemalist extremists and ul-
tranationalists suspicious of religious 
and ethnic minorities runs deep. Evidence emerged in the 1980s and 
1990s of something Turks call the “deep state,” a mysterious group of 
conspirators with connections high in the state and military bureauc-
racy that over many years funded and protected violent groups that 
killed Kurdish leaders, leftist intellectuals, journalists, judges, and other 
broadly defined “enemies of the state.” Recently links have been found 
between these former officers and suspects in the murder of Turkish-
Armenian journalist Hrant Dink and several other political murders 
over the past year. There also appears to be cross-fertilization between 
ultra-nationalists and fringe radical Islamists, the outlines of which are 
only now becoming clear. 
While the more immediate threat to Turkish democracy appears to 
be coming from the secular camp, creeping conservatism, corruption 
and the dangers of political monopolization are legitimate causes for 
concern that are driving the campaign against AKP. People fear that the 
AKP will consolidate power over all branches of government, leaving no 
counterbalancing power. (The opposition RPP lost votes in this election 
and is widely viewed as lacking leadership or new ideas.) The AKP has 
disavowed Islam as a political ideology, yet contains under its broad 
umbrella a core group of committed Islamists who would like to ban 
the sale and consumption of alcohol in public places, hold conserva-
tive ideas about gender roles and are unwelcoming of women in the 
public arena or in positions of authority and power, and who are gener-
ally as intolerant of secular lifestyles as Kemalists are of Muslim ones. 
Nevertheless, the AKP fielded more female candidates in this election 
than the RPP and the number of women legislators doubled to over 
eight percent. But conservative and nationalist influences have under-
mined the implementation and effectiveness of many of the liberal 
laws passed by the AKP as part of its alignment with EU requirements, 
particularly those broadening ethnic and religious minority rights. 
The dangerous hot and cold games the EU has been playing with 
Turkey’s membership bid have exacerbated Turkish suspicions about 
Europe’s ultimate aims in the region, inflamed nationalist sentiment, 
and emboldened ultranationalists whose actions, in a self-fulfilling 
cycle, add to Turkey’s negative tally on the part of Europeans who do 
not wish to see the country join the EU. The United States also has been 
unwilling or unable to pressure Iraqi Kurds to stop the PKK from cross-
ing into Turkey. In Turkey, this seeming disregard of Turkey’s own terror 
situations appears unforgivable and is a major cause for the growth of 
anti-U.S. sentiment. 
In his post-election speech, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan re-
committed to the path of EU membership and reform. General Yasar 
Buyukanit, the chief of general staff, however, also reiterated the army’s 
position regarding Gül’s candidacy. Gül has signalled he still wishes to 
run for the presidency, keeping the government on a collision course 
with the army. Turkey’s military establishment, which sees itself as the 
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